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Abstract: 
 
Older adults (OAs) report less overall mind-wandering than younger adults (YAs) but more task-
related interference (TRI; mind-wandering about the task). The current study examined TRI 
while manipulating older adults’ performance-related concerns. We compared groups for which 
memory-related stereotype threat (ST) was activated or relieved to a control group. Participants 
completed an operation span task containing mind-wandering probes. ST-activated OAs reported 
more TRI than ST-relieved OAs and had worse performance on the operation span task. This 
study illustrates that environmental context triggers current concerns and determines, in part, the 
frequency and content of mind-wandering. 
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Mind-wandering is a common experience. Younger adults (YAs) report mind-wandering about 
things unrelated to the task (task-unrelated thoughts; TUTs) 30%–50% of the time in everyday 
life (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and 50–70% of the time during laboratory 
tasks (Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). Various factors 
influence mind-wandering. For example, YAs with lower executive control abilities mind-
wander more than YAs with higher executive control on challenging tasks (McVay & Kane, 
2009; Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Unsworth 
& McMillan, 2013). It is not surprising that, in-the-moment TUTs are also associated with 
impaired cognitive performance (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008; McVay & Kane, 
2012a). In addition to TUTs, individuals may mind-wander about the task itself (task-related 
interference; TRI). For example, one might monitor their task performance or mind-wander 
about task strategies. Although TRI experiences are tangentially related to the task, they are not 
directly about responding to task stimuli. Furthermore, both TUTs and TRI (McVay & Kane, 
2012b) are associated with errors on cognitive tasks. Therefore, TRI is characterized as mind-
wandering. The mind-wandering literature has principally focused on TUTs rather than TRI, and 
earlier mind-wandering studies did not distinguish TRI, so participants may have misclassified 
TRI experiences either as on-task or as TUTs. 
 
MIND-WANDERING AND AGING 
 
Normal aging is characterized by cognitive changes, with performance declining on numerous 
abilities, including executive control (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Salthouse, 1991; Schaie, 1994). It 
has been proposed that executive control deficits allow off-task thoughts to enter consciousness 
(McVay & Kane, 2010). Because OAs have worse executive control capabilities than do YAs, 
one might expect OAs to mind-wander more than YAs. It is surprising that the opposite is found, 
with OAs reporting fewer TUTs and less overall mind-wandering than YAs (Frank, Nara, 
Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Giambra, 1989; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012). However, OAs report more TRI than do YAs 
(Frank et al., 2015; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay et al., 2012a, 2013). 
This can be explained by a theory that proposes that mind-wandering occurs when one’s current 
concerns trigger off-task thoughts, and executive control fails to inhibit them (McVay & Kane, 
2010). OAs might TUT less and experience TRI more than YAs in laboratory settings because 
the context triggers different concerns. Being on a familiar college campus may trigger everyday 
concerns in YAs, increasing TUTs. That same testing environment may trigger concerns about 
cognitive decline in OAs (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000), increasing performance monitoring and 
thus TRI. The current study directly tests the “Control Failures × Current Concerns” (CF × C) 
framework (McVay & Kane, 2010) by manipulating performance-related concerns in OAs. 
 
MIND-WANDERING, AGING, AND STEREOTYPE THREAT 
 
Stereotype threat (ST) is defined as being at risk for behaving in a way that confirms a negative 
stereotype about a group one belongs to (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Many individuals believe that 
aging particularly leads to memory impairment (Hummert, 1999). Although structural changes in 
the brain are one cause of memory deficits in OAs, social factors may also contribute. For 
example, when OAs are exposed to negative stereotypes about aging and cognition, their 
memory performance suffers (for a review, see Barber & Mather, 2014). Factors such as 
increased physiological stress, effortful suppression of negative emotions, and performance 
monitoring have been proposed as mechanisms by which ST leads to performance deficits 
(Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008). It has been suggested that, if one is using their cognitive 
resources to suppress negative emotions and to engage in metacognitions, then fewer resources 
are left to respond optimally to task demands (Schmader, Forbes, Zhang, & Mendes, 2009; 
Schmader et al., 2008; Schuster, Martiny, & Schmader, 2015). 
 
Although past research shows that priming of performance-related concerns increases worry-
laden task evaluation (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & 
Kiesner, 2005) and it has been proposed that ST increases TRI, research in the ST literature 
typically measures off-task thoughts using retrospective questions that may not ask about both 
TUTs and TRI (Cadinu et al., 2005). Retrospective questionnaires also require participants to 
report their mind-wandering experiences after testing has finished, potentially resulting in 
participants overlooking or forgetting some mind-wandering episodes (Beilock et al., 2007; 
Smallwood et al., 2008). 
 
Studies have examined the effect of ST on probe-caught mind-wandering. Mrazek et al. 
(2011) examined the effect of math-gender ST in female YAs. Thought probes within a math 
task asked participants to indicate, on a Likert-scale from 1 to 10, the degree to which they mind-
wandered before the probe appeared. A retrospective measure of TUTs and TRI was also 
administered after the task. It was found that ST led to worse math performance, and a 
simultaneous regression predicting probe-caught mind-wandering from retrospective TUTs and 
TRI revealed that the thought probes were more strongly related to retrospective TUTs rather 
than retrospective TRI. However, there may have been methodological limitations. The online 
probes did not include different mind-wandering categories to choose from, so the results were 
dependent on participants being able to accurately remember what they mind-wandered about 
during testing. In our lab, we have completed two studies examining the effect of activating 
math-gender ST on math performance in female YAs (Jordano & Touron, 2015). In both studies, 
ST activation increased probe-caught TRI. These YA studies suggest that the environmental 
cuing of performance concerns influences the frequency and content of mind-wandering, lending 
support for the “CF × C” framework (McVay & Kane, 2010). 
 
CURRENT AIMS 
 
The current study further tested the CF × C framework (McVay & Kane, 2010) by systematically 
activating and relieving memory-related ST in OAs. Other work has supported this framework 
by priming everyday personal concerns in YAs and finding increased TUTs but not TRI (Kopp, 
D’Mello, & Mills, 2015; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011; McVay & Kane, 2013). However, the 
current study is the first to activate performance-related concerns in OAs to determine potential 
causes of OAs’ activated TRI. Although there has been concern that OAs thought reports may be 
less valid than those of YAs due to OAs either having an unawareness of their mind-wandering 
experiences or unwillingness to report mind-wandering, eye-tracking data indicate that OAs’ 
thought reports are as valid as YAs’ thought reports (Frank et al., 2015). We predicted that OAs 
with activated performance-related concerns would report more TRI and would have worse 
memory performance than OAs relieved of performance-related concerns. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
We tested 30 YAs (18–25, Mage = 19.20 years, SDage = 1.16 years) and 90 OAs (60–75, Mage 
= 67.51 years, SDage = 3.89 years). This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. YAs were undergraduates participating for 
course credit. OAs were community volunteers paid a modest honorarium. All participants 
scored greater than 20/50 on a near visual acuity test and none had a history of stroke or 
dementia. OAs in the control (M = .2.148, SE = .237) and ST relief (M = 2.067, SE = .377) 
groups reported taking more medications than YAs (M = .867, SE = .184; ps < .05). OAs in the 
ST activated group (M = 1.704, SE = .324) reported taking more medications than YAs, although 
this difference was not significant (p > .05). OAs in the control (M = 33.400, SE = 1.556), ST 
relief (M = 31.300, SE = 1.196), and ST activated (M = 30.533, SE = 1.176) groups scored lower 
on processing speed (Pattern Comparison; Salthouse, 1993) than YAs (M = 35.833, SE = 
1.337; ps < .05). Finally, OAs in the control (M = 23.367, SE = 1.177), ST relief (M = 
24.200, SE = 1.222), and ST activated (M = 23.033, SE = 1.253) groups had higher vocabulary 
(Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) than YAs (M = 13.733, SE = .663; ps < .05). Importantly, 
there were no differences between OA groups in age, medications, processing speed, and 
vocabulary (ps > .05). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Stereotype threat manipulation 
 
OAs were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: relief of memory-related ST, activation 
of memory-related ST, and control. Thirty OAs underwent a manipulation to activate ST, which 
involved reading two fictitious newspaper articles (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003) 
that characterized age-related memory changes as biologically driven and inevitable, and were 
told that they would soon complete a memory task. Thirty OAs relieved of ST read two fictitious 
newspaper articles that described age-related memory changes as mediated by lifestyle practices 
and were told that they would soon complete a math task. To avoid demand characteristics, 
participants were told the article was for other research and rated article comprehensibility. 
Thirty OA and 30 YA control participants received no ST intervention. Experimental task 
instructions can be found in the Table S1 in the online supplemental materials. 
 
Operation span task (OSPAN) 
 
After completing a health and demographics questionnaire and the measures of visual acuity, 
processing speed, and vocabulary, participants completed the automated OSPAN task (Conway 
et al., 2005). The OSPAN is a working memory task that requires participants to alternate 
between verifying simple math equations and studying letters for a later recall task. At the end of 
each trial, participants must recall, in correct serial order, the letters presented during the trial. 
The OSPAN used consisted of 81 trials, with 27 trials each of set sizes (numbers of consecutive 
equation/letter pairs) of 3, 4, and 5. We chose the OSPAN because it could be framed as either a 
math task or as a memory task, depending on the condition. During the OSPAN participants 
responded to 9 thought probes which appeared at quasi-random intervals approximately every 2 
min (see Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013). Thought probes could appear (a) after 
participants saw the final math equation within a trial, but before they verified the answer for that 
equation, (b) after the final math equation within the trial had been verified, but before the final 
letter to be remembered was presented, or (c) at the end of the trial after the participant saw the 
last letter to be remembered. Participants were instructed to indicate what they were thinking 
about immediately before the probe appeared, and were provided with descriptions of the 
response choices: (a) the task; (b) task approach; (c) task evaluation, (d) everyday things, (e) 
current state of being, (f) personal worries, (g) daydreams, or (h) other. 
 
Using the probe responses, we calculated mean proportions of TUT, TRI, and on-task thoughts. 
We separated TRI into two subtypes. It has been suggested that ST primarily increases worry-
laden monitoring of task performance, which we label “reactive TRI,” corresponding to Option 3 
above. However, it is possible that TRI can also be about task approach or strategy, which we 
label “proactive TRI,” corresponding to Option 2 above. In two previous experiments looking at 
math-gender ST in female YAs, control and ST participants reported both TRI subtypes, with ST 
participants reporting more overall TRI, proactive TRI, and reactive TRI. 
 
Prior to completing the OSPAN, participants were told that mind-wandering within the lab is 
normal and expected, to de-stigmatize mind-wandering and encourage honest reporting. 
Participants practiced the math verification portion, the letter recall portion, and the math 
verification and letter recall portions together before data collection began. Math verification and 
letter recall accuracies were recorded during the OSPAN. During the task, participants received 
feedback regarding trial-level letter recall accuracy, trial level math verification accuracy, and 
cumulative math verification accuracy. Participants were asked to try to keep their cumulative 
math verification accuracy at least 85% correct. The difficulty of the math verifications problems 
was held constant across participants and the amount of time participants had to complete the 
math verification trials was determined by their average trial completion time during practice. 
 
Additional measures 
 
A variety of computerized posttask questionnaires were administered. The Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire is a retrospective measure of thought content (DSSQ; Matthews, Joyner, Gilliland, 
Huggins, & Falconer, 1999) that includes eight questions assessing TUTs (e.g., “I thought about 
something that happened to me earlier”) and eight questions assessing TRI (e.g., “I thought about 
how I should work more carefully”). The DSSQ has been used in prior work and was included to 
determine if retrospective reports of mind-wandering were similar to probe-caught reports of 
mind-wandering. 
 
An additional goal of the current study was to examine factors that influence mind-wandering 
and performance. We conducted exploratory mediational analyses to gain a better understanding 
of factors expected to influence amount of TRI and OSPAN performance; these can be found in 
the online supplemental materials. We included posttask questions about self-rated task 
difficulty, focus, stress, and effort, and an affect scale (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
[PANAS]; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Kane et al., 2007; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & 
Phillips, 2009). Because ST effects may be mediated by importance of good performance in the 
stereotype domain (Ennis, Hess, & Smith, 2013) and anxiety during completion of the 
stereotyped task (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 2005), we included the 
Anxiety and Achievement subscales of the Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (MIA; 
Dixon & Hultsch, 1984). The means and standard errors for these measures are listed in Table 1. 
Prior to debriefing, participants were asked to write down what they believed the study was 
about. No participants indicated that they believed the study was about age-related ST in mind-
wandering experiences. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
TUTs, TRI, and OSPAN Performance 
 
We predicted that the YA group would report more TUTs than all OA groups. As expected, there 
was an effect of condition on TUTs, F(3, 116) = 4.856, p = .003, η2 = .112, with YAs reporting a 
higher proportion of TUTs than control OAs (d = .726), ST relief OAs (d = .753), and ST 
activated OAs (d = .766; ps < .05; see Table 1 and Figure 1). There were no differences between 
control and ST relief OAs (d = .052), control and ST activated OAs (d = .046), and ST activated 
and relief OAs (d = .103; ps > .05). Most critically, we also predicted that ST activated OAs 
would report more TRI than ST relief OAs and YAs. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for proportion of TRI revealed an effect of condition, F(3, 116) = 5.201, p = .002, η2. = .120. ST 
activated OAs reported more TRI than YAs, t(58) = −3.362, p = .001, d = .885 and ST relief 
OAs, t(58) = −2.694, p = .009, d = .608. ST activated OAs also reported a numerically higher 
proportion of TRI than OA controls, t(58) = −1.461, p = .149, d = .330, although this difference 
was not statistically significant. The overall ANOVA including both TUTs and TRI confirmed a 
difference between type of mind-wandering, F(1, 116) = 8.815, p = .004, η2 = .071. An 
interaction of mind-wandering type with condition was also obtained, F(3, 116) = 7.604, p < 
.001, η2 = .164, as younger adults reported less TRI relative to TUTs (d = .6199) whereas each of 
the older adult conditions reported more TRI relative to TUTs (dcontrol = .6854, dST relief = 
.4647, dST activated = −1.003; ps < .05). There were no group differences in proportion of on-
task thoughts, F(3, 116) = 1.615, p = .190, η2 = .040. 
 
 
 
We made no predictions regarding which group would report the most proactive TRI. There was 
a significant effect of condition on proactive TRI, F(3, 116) = 3.097, p = .030, η2 = .074, with ST 
activated OAs reporting more proactive TRI than YAs, t(58) = −2.312, p < .001, d = .635. ST 
activated OAs also reported more proactive TRI than did ST relief OAs and control OAs, 
although these differences were not significant, t(58) = −1.978, p = .053, d = .517 and, t(58) = 
−1.336, p = .096, d = .345, respectively. We did anticipate group differences in reactive TRI, in 
accordance with the anticipated influence on ST on worry-laden monitoring. A significant effect 
of condition for reactive TRI was found, F(3, 116) = 2.702, p = .049, η2 = .065, with ST 
activated OAs reporting more reactive TRI than YAs, t(58) = −2.719, p = .009, d = .752. ST 
activated OAs did not, however, report significantly more reactive TRI than ST relief OAs, t(58) 
= −1.611, p = .057, d = .414 or control OAs, t(58) = −0.528, p = .280, d = .137. 
 
Within the OA sample, we predicted that ST activated OAs would have the lowest letter recall 
accuracy and ST relief OAs would have the highest letter recall accuracy. A main effect of 
condition was found, F(3, 116) = 3.226, p = .025, η2 = .079. As predicted, OAs in the ST 
activated condition had lower letter recall accuracy than YAs, t(58) = 2.704, p = .009, d = .690, 
the ST relief OAs, t(58) = 2.391, p = .020, d = .613, and control OAs, t(58) = 1.817, p = .075, d = 
.394. Because our ST manipulation focused on memory-related ST, and because there is not a 
wide-spread stereotype regarding age and mathematical ability, we made no predictions 
regarding the effects of condition on math verification accuracy within the OA sample. A main 
effect of condition was found for math verification accuracy, F(3, 116) = 2.910, p = .038,η2 = 
.071, with YAs obtaining higher math accuracy than did the ST activated OA group, t(58) = 
2.327, p = .024, d = .698 but not the ST relief OA (d = .600) or control (d = .447) OA groups (ps 
> .05). Although the ST activated OA group numerically had the lowest math accuracy of the 
four groups, math accuracy did not differ significantly between control and ST relief (d = .229), 
control and ST activated (d = .405), and ST relief and activated (d = .200) OAs (ps > .05). 
 
Analysis of Supplementary Self-Report Measures 
 
In addition to the online thought probes embedded in the OSPAN task, we included additional 
posttask questions to gain a better understanding of which factors influence mind-wandering and 
task performance (see Table 1). We found an effect of condition on DSSQ TUT scores, F(3, 113) 
= 5.753, p = .001, η2 = .132. The YA group, in addition to having the highest probe-caught 
TUTs, also had higher DSSQ TUT scores than control (d = .728), ST relief (d = .827), and ST 
activated (d = .717) OAs (ps < .05). Overall, DSSQ TUT scores were positively correlated with 
probe-caught TUT reports, r = .416, p < .001. We found no effect of condition on DSSQ TRI 
scores, F(3, 113) = 1.646, p = .183, η2 = .042, although DSSQ TRI scores were positively 
correlated with probe-caught TRI reports, r = .347, p < .001. 
 
Because affect has been found to influence mind-wandering and because negative affect (Kane et 
al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2009) we included the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). Consistent 
with past findings, there were age differences in positive affect, F(3, 113) = 12.035, p < .001, 
η2 = .242, with the YA group reporting lower positive affect than control (d = 1.010), ST relief 
(d = 1.212) and ST activated (d = 1.076) OAs (ps < .05). There was no effect of condition on 
negative affect, F(3, 113) = 1.979, p = .121, η2 = .050. ST activated OAs did not differ in affect 
compared with ST relief OAs, despite the fact that they engaged in more TRI. Several single-
item, Likert-scale posttask questions were included to measure factors that might influence 
mind-wandering and recall performance, along with the MIA (Dixon & Hultsch, 1984). These 
measures along with correlations between mind-wandering variables, OSPAN performance, and 
posttask measures are discussed in the online supplemental materials. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The current study tested the CF × C framework of mind-wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010) by 
manipulating current concerns about cognitive performance in OAs. We found that ST activated 
OAs reported significantly more TRI than did OAs relieved of ST. ST activated OAs also had 
memory performance that was significantly worse than the performance of ST relief OAs. These 
results replicate past work on ST in female YAs showing that activation of ST results in 
increased TRI and impaired math performance (Jordano & Touron, 2015). 
 
This finding that ST increases TRI supports the CF × C framework (McVay & Kane, 2010), 
which proposes that frequency and content of mind-wandering is determined, in part, by the 
degree to which one’s current concerns are activated by the environmental context. It is worth 
noting that control OAs who received no explicit ST activation had proportions of TRI and math 
verification accuracy that were intermediate between those of the ST activated OA group and the 
ST relief OA group. The difference in proportion of TRI between ST activated OAs and control 
OAs was only numerically different and not statistically significant, and it is possible that the 
normal laboratory testing environment is sufficient to trigger increased current concerns about 
cognition in OA research volunteers. This may explain the typical finding of activated TRI in 
OAs compared with YAs (Frank et al., 2015; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; 
McVay et al., 2012a, 2013). 
 
Although increased proactive TRI might be expected to improve task performance, this was not 
the case in the current study. Although ST activated OAs indicated mind-wandering about task 
approach significantly more than both YAs and ST relief OAs, this group also had the worst 
performance. Overall, proportion of probe-caught TRI, proportion of probe-caught reactive TRI, 
and proportion of probe-caught proactive TRI, were all negatively correlated with OSPAN letter 
recall performance. It is possible that such strategizing does improve task performance in 
different tasks or in more extensive training situations; future research should explore these 
possibilities. It is also possible that participants were not considering potentially beneficial 
strategies to implement on future trials when they chose the proactive TRI response option on the 
online thought probes. Instead, participants may have been evaluating past or current strategies 
when they chose proactive TRI, which we would not necessary expect to lead to improved 
performance on future trials. More work is needed to determine the exact contents of 
participants’ thoughts when they indicate TRI on online thought probes. 
 
Our results may be explained by different accounts of ST. It is possible that increased TRI in 
stereotyped OAs resulted from cognitive resources being diverted away from the task and toward 
processing information associated with negative stereotypes (Schmader & Johns, 2003), allowing 
mind-wandering experiences to enter into consciousness and disrupt performance. It is also 
possible that TRI did not result from diverted cognitive resources, and that OAs’ prepotent 
tendency to engage in TRI was instead strengthened by ST (Jamieson & Harkin2, 2007). More 
work is needed to determine the mechanism by which ST increases TRI. The current studies 
provide insight into why OAs traditionally report a higher mean proportion of TRI than do YAs, 
even though they report less mind-wandering overall (Frank et al., 2015; Giambra, 1989; 
Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay et al., 2012a, 
2013). This research provides support for the CF × C framework (McVay & Kane, 2010) of 
mind-wandering by demonstrating a role of personal concerns and environmental context on the 
frequency and content of mind-wandering. This framework can be further tested by activating 
current, everyday concerns in in both YAs and OAs, and examining whether this manipulation 
increases task-unrelated thought. 
 
In conclusion, the current study provides evidence for ST as a mind-wandering trigger. OAs 
relieved of ST exhibited decreased TRI and improved accuracy on a memory task compared with 
OAs with activated memory-related ST. Current concerns activated by instructional 
manipulations and the testing environment appear to be one cause for more frequent TRI in OAs. 
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